‘If independence goes, the planning system goes’: New political governance and the English planning inspectorate by Hickman, Hannah & Boddy, Martin
  
 
 
 
 
‘If independence goes, the planning system goes’: New Political 
Governance and the English Planning Inspectorate 
 
WORKING PAPER 
 
 
Hannah Hickman, Senior Research Fellow,  
University of the West of England 
hannah.hickman@uwe.ac.uk 
 
Professor Martin Boddy, University of the West of England 
Martin.boddy@uwe.ac.uk 
 
  
 Abstract 
Debate about the relationship between the UK Government’s political executive and its 
administrative civil service has endured. Reforms following the formation of the 2010 
Coalition Government saw major restructuring of the civil service, with strengthened central 
control over arms-length-bodies. Control appears to have been driven by desire for a more 
politically responsive civil service, with Ministers having a heightened sense of their 
accountability. 
This paper reviews empirical evidence from interviews with forty professionals, of increased 
central control over the Planning Inspectorate, an executive agency of the UK Government. It 
highlights the acute tensions for inspectors and the planning system of a blurring of lines 
between policy and administration: tensions that arise from the Inspectorate’s quasi-judicial 
function and culture and appearance of independence. In so doing, the paper contributes a 
case-specific example of shifts within models of public administration, from new public 
management to more plural forms of new political governance.  
Introduction 
The ‘bonfire of the quangos’, the wholesale abolition of many ‘arm-length bodies’ and the 
radical restructuring of many others implemented by the UK Government following the 2010 
national election signalled a major shift in relations between government and the civil 
service. It saw prevailing models of governance captured in what had been termed New 
Public Management with public servants in arms-length bodies operating as agents of 
government, increasingly displaced by New Political Governance (Aucoin 2012). These 
changes reflected the desire on the part of government not only to challenge bureaucratisation 
and to roll back the over-extended state but also to secure greater political responsiveness and 
control over the civil service. Those bodies that did survive the bonfire, executive agencies in 
particular, nevertheless typically experienced a tightening of control from their parent 
departments and ministers (Flinders and Tonkiss, 2016).  
This paper provides a case study of the Planning Inspectorate in England (PINS) 
using empirical evidence drawn from interviews with forty professional respondents.  
Itself an ‘executive agency’ and a body at the heart of the national land use planning 
system, the study focussed on the impact of these changes on PINS. The Inspectorate 
survived the aftermath of the 2010 election but was subsequently exposed to unprecedented 
pressures following reform of the national planning system including legal challenge, 
political contestation and much increased scrutiny from government ministers.  
Initially, we focus on the transition from public management to public governance in 
general terms and the implications for arms-length bodies in particular. We then consider the 
evidence for the tightening of executive control over the Planning Inspectorate and the extent 
to which any tightening of control impacted the work of the Inspectorate, on planning 
outcomes and the operation of the national planning system itself. Finally, we examine the 
extent to which any shift can be understood in terms of new modes of political governance, 
how this intersects with the impacts of planning reform and the implications for our 
understanding of these new modes of political governance. 
From New Public Management to Political Governance  
Under New Public Management, seen as the dominant mode of governance from the early 
1990s (Hood, 1991; Hood and Dickson, 2015), public servants were portrayed as operating at 
a distance with devolved responsibilities for policy implementation and acting as agents of 
government. With the intent to de-couple policy and delivery, politicians ‘had a strategic, 
goal-setting role’ and civil servants were ‘supposed to be autonomous managers held to 
account through performance arrangements and incentives’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, 
quoted in Christensen 2012, 1). As Flinders observes, ‘The logic of NPM has been to 
encourage policymakers to ‘depoliticise’ functions’ (quoted in Laffin, 2016, 356). The 
‘embedded tension’ between politicians and what they term the ‘neutral competence of a non-
partisan civil service’ was ‘kept in balance by applying well-established constitutional 
conventions, ethical principles and agreed practices’ (Boston and Halligan, 2012, 204). 
From the late 1990s increasing concern within national governments saw ministers 
‘struggling at times to ensure that their political priorities and objectives are given 
appropriate weight’ (Boston and Halligan, 2012, 210). Increased political interest in 
outcomes, according to Boston and Halligan, created a ‘heightened point of contestation’ 
between ministers and civil servants which was particularly acute where civil servants were 
‘delivering specific statutory responsibilities that they are required to exercise independently 
of the government of the day’ and where ‘responsiveness to the political will of the 
government of the day … is not the only imperative guiding the actions of public servants’ 
(ibid). This, they argued could result in public servants being pulled in ‘potentially 
irreconcilable directions’ between political responsiveness and much heralded principles of 
independence and impartiality. These concerns were heightened in a context of increased 
media challenge, increasing demands for transparency, the more overt role of stakeholders 
and interest groups, greater policy challenge and an increasingly volatile electorate (Grube 
2015). The response saw politicians seeking to ‘reassert their authority’ (Boston and 
Halligan, 2012, 204) and increasingly ‘preoccupied with strengthening the capacity of the 
centre, both politically and administratively’ (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). This shift 
towards New Political Governance, and which Laffin (2016) later termed ‘Post-Democratic’ 
forms of governance, sought to ‘enable political executives to regain a degree of political 
control’ (Christensen, 2012, 2). 
 Consequences of this model have been seen as permanent electoral campaigning, 
growth of political advisers and ministerial staff, potential politicisation of senior ranks of the 
civil service or at least promotion of those on board with the government’s agenda, and an 
expectation of public support on the part of civil servants for partisan policy (Grube 2015; 
Aucoin, 2012). In this context ‘… the risk of partisan politicization is increased as public 
servants are publicly exposed by virtue of their more frequent public interactions with 
stakeholders, organized interests, individual citizens, the media and parliamentarians’ (Jarvis 
and Bakvis, 2012, 17), giving ‘the distinction between appropriate responsiveness and 
inappropriate partisanship … a sharper edge’ (Grube 2015, 307). According to Laffin ‘the 
role of ministers has shifted towards a greater stress on “political bureaucratic management”’ 
arguing that ‘the new populist adversarial politics is evident in how politicians now challenge 
these once-secret gardens of professional-administrative decision making’ (2016, 358). 
New Political Governance and arms-length-bodies 
In the UK context, the shift towards more overt ‘political governance’ was expressed in 
particular in the wholesale abolition and restructuring of arms-length bodies or ‘quangos’ as 
one of the defining organisational form of New Public Management, a radical reform 
‘impressive in terms of not only its breadth and depth but … speed’ (Flinders and Skelcher, 
2012).  This saw 130 arms-length-bodies of different types abolished, and 150 merged into 
fewer than 70 across the full range of policy sectors (Cabinet Office, 2012). Impacts varied 
across the three main variants of arms-length-bodies. Non-departmental public bodies, the 
most common, and non-ministerial departments suffered most. Executive Agencies on the 
other hand, largely survived – a distinction that is important in the context of the Planning 
Inspectorate, itself an Executive Agency. Described as ‘semi-detached central government 
bodies’ (James et al, 2012, 58) or ‘arms of their home department’ (Cabinet Office, 2006, 3) 
Executive Agencies are designated business units, staffed by civil servants and ‘responsible 
for undertaking the executive functions of that department as distinct from giving policy 
advice’ (ibid). They have ‘a clear focus on delivering specific outputs within a framework of 
accountability to ministers’ (Cabinet Office, 2018, 4).  
Despite their similarities to other arms-length bodies, including their ‘significant 
degree of day-to-day autonomy’ (Flinders and Skelcher, 2012) they were considered beyond 
the reach of the reform process.  According to the cabinet minister at the time: ‘executive 
agencies – are not in the review's scope. They are directly controlled by Ministers who are 
accountable to Parliament for what they do’ (Hansard, 14 October 2010).  They even enjoyed 
what has been described as ‘a new lease of life under the Coalition Government (Jenkins and 
Gold, 2011), framed as ‘representing the most appropriate balance between autonomy and 
control’ (Flinders and Tonkiss, 2016), and identified as the ‘default model’ for where there is 
a need to deliver a function within central government but which requires some ‘operational 
independence’ from ministers (Minister for the Cabinet Office, quoted in Elston, 2013, 6). 
 On one level executive agencies lived on. There was, however, at another level, a 
major ‘reframing’ or ‘control shift’, transforming the relationship between parent 
departments and the surviving arms-length-bodies (Elston, 2013, 2014). This saw a shift 
away from ‘decentralisation and de-politicisation’ towards ‘centralized and politically 
proximate’ (2014, 469) achieved, according to Elston, ‘without any formal redefinition of 
“agency status”. Politicians and officials speak of agencies very differently today’ (Elston 
2014, quoted in Elston 2017, 95).  He later observed that agencies ‘superficially, look very 
much as originally intended, and yet operate quite differently in practice’ (2017, 101). 
Flinders and Tonkiss (2016) similarly identified a shift from permissive to more 
‘authoritative parenting’, a model of governance where the arm in ‘arms-length’ has been 
significantly foreshortened. Control, they argue, was now achieved through a wide range of 
both hard and soft measures, from new control frameworks and audit measures on the one 
hand, to inter-personal relationships and pressures on the other. Thus, whilst there has been 
no visible restructuring in the executive-agency relationship there has, nevertheless, been “a 
certain re-orientation concerning the steering and control of agencies” (OECD 2010, 13).  
 Identified as a ‘standard institutional choice in Europe and beyond’ (Ennser-
Jedenastik 2016, 507), shifts in the governance of agencies, particularly the balance between 
autonomy and control, are of wider international significance. UK experience appears to 
reflect more general accounts of ‘a decade of “reinventions” across Europe, ‘a counter-
reaction to “agencification”, aiming to rationalise the agency landscape to (re)enhance 
transparency, political control and government-wide efficiency (Verhoest, 2018, 328). This 
has resulted in many governments calling on ‘mechanisms and instruments … to intentionally 
influence the decisions and the behavior of agencies to achieve government objectives’ (ibid, 
333). Levels of control, it has been argued, will however vary in practice across different 
policy fields and institutions depending for example on political sensitivity, risk and salience 
to government objectives (Institute for Governance, 2012; Doern and Kernaghan, 2012; 
James and Theil, 2013). This emphasises the importance of empirical case-studies as a means 
of exploring ‘the way task-related features explain agency autonomy and control’ (Verhoest 
2018, 338), now considered.  
The Planning Inspectorate as an arms-length body 
The Planning Inspectorate in England sits at the heart of the national land-use planning 
system with responsibility for the approval of local land-use plans, hearing appeals against 
the refusal by elected local councils of individual applications from developers and others for 
permission for development and a range of other related issues1. It is an ‘executive agency’ 
falling under the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG), and 
under the control of its political head, the Secretary of State as the responsible government 
minister2. The Inspectorate exemplifies an arms-length-body: it has delegated powers to 
deliver specific outputs against the backdrop of national policy, within a framework of 
accountability but with a degree of operational independence and autonomy from ministers. 
A key antecedent to the decision to form inspectors into an executive agency was the Town 
and Country Planning Act 1968, a moment of ‘transformation’ (Grant 2000a, 16) in the 
Inspectorate’s history, which allowed the relevant Minister to appoint ‘another person’ to 
determine appeals and the soundness of plans such that planning inspectors then became 
decision makers acting on behalf of the Secretary of State. This was significant in that it 
helped to ameliorate the perceived conflict of interest of Ministers having both a policy 
maker and appellate role3. As this suggests, in looking at any specific example of an arms-
length body it is important to take account of the relevant context and, in the case of the 
                                                          
1 On appeals, planning inspectors make decisions on behalf of the Secretary of State, acting as an independent 
tribunal.  On local plans, inspectors are appointed by the Secretary of State, but act independently, making 
recommendations to local authorities as to whether prospective local plans should be adopted. 
2 The Inspectorate also carries out functions for the Welsh Government, accountable to the relevant Welsh 
Minister, and in accordance with the Welsh Planning system. The focus of this study was, however, on the 
Inspectorate’s work in England. 
3 This issue has continued to have some prominence, including in a 2001 House of Lords decision (R (Alconbury 
Developments Ltd) v SS for Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] UKHL 23) confirming that a 
Government minister can be both a policy maker and a decision taker without violation of the European 
Human Rights Law. 
Planning Inspectorate both the longer-term historical context and more contemporary factors 
are relevant.  
 In terms of historical context the core functions of the Planning Inspectorate in 
relation to the examination of local plans and planning appeal decisions have remained 
relatively unchanged since an appeal function in relation to the use of land was created in 
1909, evolving through ‘a process of pragmatic development and adjustment’ (Grant, 2000b, 
2). Forms of governance in relation to the Inspectorate including the most appropriate ‘home’ 
for inspectors within the civil service and their relationship, therefore with ministers has 
however been subject to debate prior to the emergence of the executive agency model. The 
influential 1957 Franks Committee on Administrative Tribunals - that established the 
enduring principles of fairness, openness and impartiality for the operation of administrative 
tribunals – also recommended that inspectors be placed as a tribunal under the Lord 
Chancellor to emphasise their impartiality. The then Government rejected the Committee’s 
recommendation, arguing the need for ministers to have full responsibility for decisions 
relevant to their own department - highlighting the perceived importance of a within-
department policy-operational link. The 1968 Act delegating decision-making to inspectors - 
did, however, pave the way to the formation of the Inspectorate, as recommended in the 1988 
‘Next Steps’ report on the establishment of arms-length executive agencies.  Whilst not 
therefore in formal terms a tribunal, the Inspectorate frequently refers to its role as being 
analogous to the tribunal model: 
 
The role of our inspectors is that of an impartial tribunal or decision-maker. They use 
their skills, experience, knowledge and judgement to weigh up evidence and act in a 
quasi-judicial capacity on appeals or as an impartial contributor to decision-making 
on applications (Planning Inspectorate, 2017, 6). 
 
This was reinforced in a Supreme Court judgement in 2017 which, referring to the 
Inspectorate, commented that: ‘their position is in some ways analogous to that of expert 
tribunals’ (Supreme Court, 2017, para 25). The Inspectorate also specifically continues to 
emphasise the Franks Committee principles for tribunals, of fairness, openness and 
impartiality (Planning Inspectorate, 2017, 6). It is also clear that ‘PINS doesn't make policy. 
All we do is test it’ (Richards, quoted in Carpenter 2017, 1). Policy is a matter for ministers, 
their own role being that of implementation - of advising ministers or taking decisions on 
their behalf. In doing so, they ‘are required to exercise their own independent judgement … 
within the framework of national policy as set by Government’ (Supreme Court, 2017, para 
21). The Inspectorate has a ‘strong tradition’ (Barker and Couper, 1984) of independence, a 
tradition seemingly enhanced by the operational and managerial freedoms of agencification. 
Uniquely, inspectors, as well as being civil servants, are also independent appointees, 
perceived externally as operating independently from government and free from political 
interference. 
 Second, in terms of more contemporary context, the Planning Inspectorate was itself 
radically if indirectly affected by the 2010 bonfire of the quangos. This included radical 
reform of the national planning system which saw the wholesale abolition of Regional 
Development Agencies, Regional Spatial Strategies and with them strategic level planning, 
detailed planning policy guidance and top-down targets for planned housing delivery at a 
local level.  The existing structures and processes of national planning policy were replaced 
with a new National Planning Policy Framework (DCLG, 2012). As described elsewhere 
(Boddy and Hickman, 2018, 2) this left the Planning Inspectorate faced with unprecedented 
responsibility for decisions on local plan approval and permissions for development in the 
absence of any overarching policy framework, detailed guidance or agreed targets for levels 
of new housebuilding at a local level. There were tensions, moreover, at the heart of the new 
planning policy framework, the NPPF, described by Lees and Sheppard (2015, 17) as 
incoherent and incompatible. On the one hand the new policy was rooted in the rhetoric of 
localism with the government ‘committed to passing new powers and freedoms to town halls’ 
(DCLG, 2011, 3). On the other hand, it set out a ‘presumption in favour of sustainable 
development … a golden thread running through both plan-making and decision-taking.’ 
(DCLG, 2012, para 14) – and as the Minister’s introduction put it ‘Development means 
growth’. The Planning Inspectorate found itself, therefore, faced with managing the tensions 
between mainly Conservative-voting local communities – and their elected representatives – 
resistant to growth and development and the government’s aims of economic growth and the 
development needed to support this.  Much of this was, moreover, uncharted territory in 
policy terms, ambiguity and uncertainty being such that the clear distinction between the 
responsibility of ministers for policy and that of the Inspectorate for implementation proved 
challenging in practical terms. 
The study 
Empirical evidence for this study is drawn from interviews with forty professional 
respondents conducted between July 2014 and June 2016. Interviewees included current and 
former planning inspectors (across the breadth of local plan, appeals and national 
infrastructure work), administrative civil servants in the Inspectorate, lawyers, planning 
consultants, senior local council officers, and representatives of key national organisations. 
This interview material is supplemented by documentary evidence in the form of government 
policy documents, public communication between PINS’ officials and ministers, and 
parliamentary records. 
Face-to-face, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a common topic-guide. 
The seniority of many interviewees and the potential political sensitivity of views expressed 
was such that as a condition of consent all interviews were conducted on the basis of full 
confidentiality and anonymity (Harvey, 2011). This limited the extent to which quoted 
material could be attributed to individuals, roles or organisations. In most cases, interviews 
were recorded and transcribed. Other cases relied on contemporaneous notes, facilitated by 
the presence of both authors. Transcripts and notes were coded, with thematic analysis 
undertaken using NVIVO qualitative analysis software4. 
The next three sections set out the empirical evidence for the way in which the 
Planning Inspectorate has been impacted by shifts in governance and control in the context of 
the major changes outlined in the national planning policy framework. We look: first at shifts 
associated specifically with planning reform and the radical restructuring of the planning 
policy framework; second at shifts in governance and control; and, finally, at how these have 
come together in an overall reframing of the ‘cultural’ basis of relations between government 
and the inspectorate.  
Ambiguity in planning policy reform 
First, in terms of planning reform, interviewees frequently commented on the radical nature 
of the post 2010 restructuring of planning policy describing this as ‘revolutionary’ and 
‘unprecedented’ in its impacts. The new National Planning Policy Framework, characterised 
by Travers (2013) as ‘determinedly brief’ was seen as ‘loose in many respects’. We referred 
earlier to the distinction made in formal terms between policy making and implementation. 
The NPPF was widely seen, however, as having increased ambiguity within the planning 
                                                          
4 The value of elite interviews is highly dependent on a researcher gaining the trust of and establishing a 
rapport with the interviewee, (Dexter 2006, Harvey, 2011). Access was facilitated for this study in that one of 
the researchers had previously held senior roles in planning and governance at a regional level, which helped 
to secure credibility and trust.  
system, resulting in inspectors ‘in effect making policy themselves’. One respondent observed 
that: 
A well-run planning regime has minimum grey, maximum black and white, the 
difficulties start to arise when there's … a large amount of grey … the shades of grey 
have increased …  
And another, referring to the often-quoted role of Inspectors as being to stand in the shoes of 
the Minister commented: 
If you are going to stand in the shoes of the Secretary of State, then you need to know 
what the shoes are, what they look like. There are big problems now because policy is 
delightfully unclear. 
The loss of strategic planning as the intermediate layer between national policy and local 
plans was seen as key. That local authorities were now to determine their own ‘objectively 
assessed’ housing need was a matter many interviewees saw as ‘a significant weakness’. It 
left inspectors having to decide whether local authorities had acted reasonably in the context 
of local assessments of housing need, and to do so without guidance:  
With no warning inspectors had to sort out the mess. There was no template for what 
it [housing numbers] ought roughly to be. All hell broke loose – we kept on having to 
send local authorities away. 
The result was inspectors performing ‘a de facto strategic policy function’ and ‘in effect 
making policy themselves, especially where the NPPF is silent’. This related not only to 
housing allocations in local plans, but also to planning appeal decisions relating, for example, 
to on-shore wind farms and green belt developments. Interviewees suggested that increased 
ministerial interest in planning outcomes and unease at the decisions of some inspectors 
reflected the tensions inherent in the NPPF referred to earlier between localism and the 
presumption in favour of sustainable development which planning inspectors faced in 
practical terms.  Interviewees commented on this lack of clarity in policy terms: 
There is a judgement that inspectors are making decisions that are not in accordance 
with the policy that ministers want – well that might be the case but it might be that 
the policy is not written down. 
If the Secretary of State does not like decisions that PINS is making then they should 
change the policy formally in an appropriate and democratic and transparent way … 
it’s the fudging of those issues which creates the tension between PINS and DCLG, 
between ministers and inspectors. 
Towards pragmatic forms of governance and control 
In a context of ambiguity and incoherence – and resistance to further policy reform - what we 
have seen is a range of pragmatic measures on the part of ministers aiming to exert greater 
control over the policy agenda and decision making. These have taken four main forms: (i) 
ministerial statements and letters to the Inspectorate; (ii) direct intervention in decision-
making over local plan approval; (iii) ministerial intervention in decisions on appeals where 
planning permission has been refused; and finally, (iv) pressure on inspectors to exercise 
greater pragmatism in order to secure the early approval of local plans.  
(i) Ministerial statements and letters 
Interviewees frequently referred to an unprecedented series of public letters from ministers to 
PINS publicly ‘reminding’ inspectors of core principles and ‘ensuring our policy position is 
clear’ (see DCLG 2014a, 2014b, 2015a). In the first of these, the minister described being 
‘disturbed by an Inspector’s use of language, which invited misinterpretation of government 
policy’, and ended with the instruction to circulate the letter throughout the Inspectorate to 
‘ensure that they [inspectors] understand the need to choose their words carefully and reflect 
government policy’ (DCLG 2014a, 1). These communications were described as representing 
‘a personal attack on the inspectorate’, and a direct response to local political pressures. 
According to one respondent:  
Boles had to be seen to be doing something, to reassure constituency colleagues, 
because everything coming out from Gov seemed to be very pro-housing. 
This first letter was described as ‘a game changer’, with PINS according to one interviewee 
‘having to sense-test everything that inspectors are writing’. 
Ministers also used ad-hoc policy statements to publicly address the interpretation of 
planning policy by inspectors. One former inspector commented that statements were a way 
of exerting control:  
Ministerial statements are definitely a way of exerting control over PINS …  they are 
trying to tell PINS how to do something when they [government] should change the 
NPPF. Statements have deflected attention away from Government by targeting 
inspectors. Minsters are boasting that “we are telling inspectors what to do”. It’s not 
how the system is supposed to work.  
Interviewees observed that these communications could have been better directed towards 
MPs or local authorities themselves, but in the absence of strategic plans, targets and 
guidance, the Planning Inspectorate became Government’s key regulatory mechanism: ‘what 
reforms have done is exposed the Planning Inspectorate as the only mechanism left to use.’  
(ii) Intervention in local plan examinations 
Since 2010, ministers have taken the previously unprecedented step of ‘calling-in’ local plans 
(five to date), for ministers to review – and potentially overturn - the judgement of inspectors 
following examination. In 2016, existing legislation was strengthened giving greater and 
more detailed powers of direction, enabling the Secretary of State ‘to direct the appointed 
person to ‘suspend’ the examination, to consider specified matters, to hear from specified 
persons, or to take other specified procedural steps’ (Parliament 2016, 39). Vitriolic in his 
criticism, former planning inspector, Vickery, stated ‘It is clear that centralised control of 
Inspectors and authorities is the aim” (Vickery, 2016, 540). Vickery asserted that even the 
possibility of intervention would on its own create a behavioural shift on the part of 
inspectors: ‘the threat of these draconian intervention powers by the Secretary of State … will 
be enough to cow … the appointed Inspector … and will ensure that they follow the required 
‘direction of travel’ at DCLG. The Inspector will self-censor him or herself and will ‘work 
towards’ what is perceived to be the Minister’s latest desire’ (ibid). Interviewees saw use of 
these powers as the: 
 ‘outcome of an intensely political period … … driven by lack of control. Ministers 
have got no control, that’s the end of it. They didn’t like the fact they couldn’t have 
ultimate sign off. This was a control shift.  
Inspectors were described as being ‘angered’ at such intervention: 
With Birmingham it was clear that the only way was to take land out of the green belt. 
It was the first call-in situation. The inspector was pissed off. A level of political 
interference was imposed … the local MP stirred it up – it was called in to keep him 
quiet.  
The main outcomes of the five interventions have in practice been substantial delays to plans 
being finalised. Ministers - perhaps ironically - conceded in all five cases that the inspectors’ 
recommendations had in fact been in line with national policy. Politically, however, 
intervention may in part at least have had the desired effect of demonstrating to local elected 
MPs, Councillors and voters, that Ministers had been prepared to take strong measures. 
(iii) Intervention in appeals 
There has also been an increasing propensity on the part of the minister to call in appeals 
against refusal of planning permission for individual developments and to curtail inspectors’ 
delegated authority to make decisions. In 2012 delegated decision-making powers were 
removed in cases that “may have significant long-term impact on economic growth and 
meeting housing needs across a wider area than a single local authority” (Boles, quoted in 
Hansard 26 October 2012), and in 2015 over cases related to ‘unconventional oil and gas’ 
(DCLG, 2015). Specialist planning lawyers 39 Essex Street in their annual review (2015,12) 
noted the Secretary of State’s ‘enthusiasm for recovering appeals’ whilst one MP described 
‘recovered appeals’ as ensuring that community concerns ‘will not be ignored by the “man 
from the Ministry”’ (Aldous, quoted in Hansard 2014, Column104). Ministers justified these 
shifts by the need to “consider the extent to which planning policy … is meeting the 
Government’s clear policy intentions” (quoted in Smith, 2017, 11), and the desire to “to 
illustrate” how policy should “apply in practice” (ibid, 16). 
Interviewees largely saw recovered appeals as an entirely ‘unsatisfactory way of 
seeking to provide guidance’ in the context of ambiguity, and perceived increased recovery as 
symptomatic of ‘the fact that the Secretary of State does not trust PINS’ to take the decisions 
that are expedient in political terms:  
The secretary of state … has a policy that he doesn’t really like, he’s unable to 
change that policy because it’s a coalition government ... the temptation to pervert the 
decision making through recovered appeals is not quite the way the original 
arrangements for calling things in was intended. There’s a high degree of bias 
around which ones get called in. 
There is more interest in outcomes. Look at wind-turbines – the ministerial interest 
was unprecedented. That all of them were recovered – ministers were concerned that 
inspectors wouldn’t take the decisions they wanted. 
(iv) The push for pragmatism 
Inspectors can, when considering through examination whether a local plan meets the criteria 
for it to be approved, pause the process and require a local council to undertake further work 
in line with an inspector’s interpretation of national planning policy or find that it does not 
meet the criteria in a more fundamental way. This can significantly delay the process of 
getting an approved plan in place. Many such cases turned on a local council’s view on 
planned provision for future housing need, ‘objectively assessed need’. With local plans at 
the heart of the new national planning framework and up-to-date plans providing greater 
certainty in terms of decision-making on the ground, Ministers, were, however increasingly 
concerned at lack of progress in getting local plans in place. One interviewee reported a 
minister on a visit to PINS urging inspectors to ‘for God’s sake find more plans sound’.  
A public letter to the Inspectorate and subsequent ministerial statement followed, 
calling for greater pragmatism on the part of inspectors.  The Minister stated that local 
councils: ‘… should be able to rely on Planning Inspectors to support them in the 
examination process’ (DCLG 2015c, 1), in contrast to the traditional, arms-length position.  
Inspectors were ‘instructed’ to allow councils to undertake additional work rather than be 
required to withdraw a plan, or for a local plan to be adopted pending early review despite 
‘shortcomings’ – typically in terms of provision for future housing growth. Interviewees 
perceived this instruction as being ‘very MP focussed … protecting politicians locally’. 
Another more bluntly observed that: ‘It looks like a retraction … – a farce - going against 
everything Government has been saying.’  On the other hand, according to one ex-inspector: 
It was the only practical approach to get plans moving – we couldn’t get perfect 
plans.  This is all we can do. QC’s will say the same – it’s all that can be done given 
the contradictions between OAN and localism.  
Pragmatism was subsequently evident in an increasing number of cases where inspectors 
approved plans with a shortfall of land-supply for housing but subject to an immediate or 
early review (Edgar, 2017). 
Shifts in the governance culture 
Impacts of planning reform as described above combine with more explicit measures on the 
part of government to secure greater control over the policy agenda, driving what can be 
described as a significant shift in the overall culture of governance of the Inspectorate, culture 
in the sense of norms, behaviours and practices. Respondents with recent experience within 
PINS suggested ‘subtle shifts’ in its governance, leading to a sense that ‘life has undoubtedly 
changed in PINS’.  
First, one inspector referred to the ‘framework document’ (The Planning Inspectorate, 
Welsh Government, Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012) which sets 
out the formal relationship between PINS and its parent departments, including 
‘arrangements for governance, financial delegations and the payment and expenditure of 
public money and expectations on monitoring, reporting and exchange of information’ (4). 
Referring specifically to the ‘sponsorship’ element of the framework, detailing the 
relationship between PINS and its parent departments DCLG and the Welsh Government, the 
inspector’s comments mirrored the observation elsewhere that frameworks represent “a 
certain re-orientation concerning the steering and control of agencies” (OECD 2010, 13):  
The PINS framework document absolutely reads like ‘control’ … There has definitely 
been a change of emphasis. 
Another respondent suggested that the framework was a direct product of the Coalition’s civil 
service reform agenda, stating: 
Those outcomes of the civil service reform plan – like frameworks - which are about 
civil servants delivering what ministers want … are not appropriate to an agency like 
PINS. PINS is supposed to be an arms-length body, semi-autonomous. 
Striking is the framework’s description of a vertical hierarchy between PINS and DCLG, in 
contrast to the original hub-and-spoke conception of agencies (Rutter, 2014, Elston 2014). It 
states that ‘issues arising are to be resolved by DCLG’ and only that ‘PINs will … have the 
opportunity to comment’ (The Planning Inspectorate et al, 2012, 5). Effective governance is 
expected to be managed by a substantial list of regular liaison meetings, including ‘regular 
day to day contact’ (ibid, para 27), perceived as a shift as compared to previous levels of 
communication. One respondent observed that: ‘When X was Chief Executive of PINS X went 
out of his way to keep it out of Whitehall and to keep Whitehall out of PINS. The relationship 
is much more personal now – CLG ringing us to discuss cases is now the mainstream 
approach.’ One inspector described the increased interaction between PINS and its parent 
department as ‘attempts at soft control arising out of problems in the NPPF’ and several 
interviewees noted ‘a trend of Whitehall engaging more closely’, and ‘a mainstream culture 
of constant telephone calls’ with ‘pressures to acquiesce’. The framework document also 
acknowledges the ‘need for changes … in light of evolving departmental policy aims, 
operational factors, and the performance of PINS’ (ibid, 5) and states that PINS will be 
subject to triennial review, including the need ‘to provide robust challenge of the continuing 
need for PINS, both in terms of its functions and its form as an Executive Agency’ (ibid, 29).  
 
Second, respondents also spoke of greater difficulty as compared to pre-2010 arrangements in 
budget sign-off. One talked of ‘departmental meddling in detail’: 
“There were definite attempts to control where the money was being spent – it’s now 
not so easy to get budget signed off.” 
and another intimated that the ‘Centre’ wished to re-gain overall budgetary control of PINS: 
“X said I think the finance director should account directly to the finance director in 
London …. Where they sit in London they see these people down in Bristol, we need 
command and control, so if we’re looking after their accounts … then they're going to 
need my approval. 
Third, several interviewees suggested the appointment in 2014 of Simon Ridley as PINS 
chief executive - a career civil servant with a Treasury background - as an attempt to exert 
control over PINS. Previously this role had been filled by an external appointee or by the 
Chief Planning Inspector. Ridley, it was observed, had no previous planning experience and 
whilst lack of direct substantive experience relevant to a new role was by no means unusual 
in civil service terms in general, historically, it had been in relation to the Planning 
Inspectorate. As one ex-inspector observed, ‘we are in a different place because we are just 
one stop on a civil servants’ career’.  Another ex-inspector observed: 
When Simon Ridley was appointed we all thought, ‘bloody hell, a bloke from the 
Treasury …  well that spells the end of PINS.  
Finally, the Planning Inspectorate, in its own Annual Report, highlighted the ‘increased 
political focus’ as a risk ‘peaking at very high at the start of the year’, the consequences of 
which were described as ‘increased criticism of inspectors’ decisions … and damage to our 
reputation with communities, developers and Ministers” (Planning Inspectorate, 2016, 13). 
 
 In terms of quantifiable impacts on planning outcomes, interviewees were 
circumspect: 
There are attempts without outcomes … or should I say no significant outcomes, one 
or two minor influences. If planning was further down the political agenda it would 
easier. 
The impacts of attempts to control are largely subtle, and we are probably protected 
by our quasi-judical function. But attempts can’t work, we can’t allow them to work. 
They are rare but I think they are happening more often. There are no examples to 
quote prior to 2010 on the level and scale of recent attempts. 
For interviewees however, the greatest risk was to the Inspectorate’s culture of independence 
which was described as ‘becoming tarnished’ and having ‘shifted with the coalition 
government’.  It was reported to us by one interviewee, that an internal review had taken 
place into the PINS’ independence during 2013-20145, prompted by ministerial concerns 
about their lack of control over PINS and the potential benefits of re-integration into its 
parent department’6: 
Ministers wanted far greater control over independent inspectors - they didn’t like 
this element of the Planning Inspectorate and wanted to be able to more closely 
influence outcomes.  
Lots of ministers would like to see PINS brought back in-house – to have greater 
control over decision making. 
Striking was the observation that inspectors historically saw themselves ‘as planning 
inspectors first and civil servants second’, whereas now ‘they are increasingly seeing 
themselves as agents in the delivery of government policy, that’s a shift’. Critical however 
was that independence was perceived widely by those interviewed as fundamental to the 
legitimacy of planning decisions: 
The differences between ourselves and other arms-length bodies is the quasi-judicial 
role, the history of independence … The arms-length thing has got to be there. If 
independence goes – the planning system goes. 
Formally, the Inspectorate is an arms-length-body, charged with implementing government – 
and ministerial policy. In terms of organisational culture however, it still clings strongly to its 
                                                          
5 Whilst no direct causal link can be inferred, over the same period, abolition of PINS was proposed in the 
course of two separate adjournment debates in the Parliament (see for example, Hansard 2013). 
6 An initial request made to DCLG under the freedom information act returned ‘no information’ on a potential 
review of PINS’ agency positioning. A further request confirmed that a review did take place over the 2013-14 
period considering the re-integration of PINS into DCLG, but no further information on content was traceable. 
quasi-judicial, tribunal-like status and the Franks Committee principles of fairness, openness 
and impartiality.  This in, itself is, in part responsible for the tension between the Inspectorate 
on the one hand and government and ministers of state on the other. 
Discussion and conclusion 
The case-study presented here provides substantial evidence of the tightening of executive 
influence and control over both the overall governance of the Planning Inspectorate and over 
the decisions of individual inspectors. Here we discuss what drove these changes over this 
particular period, the implications for the Inspectorate, impacts on the planning system, and 
what the evidence tells us about the nature of the New Political Governance in a particular 
policy sector. 
The drivers of change 
Planning and the national planning system, particularly as they related to the politically 
charged arena of new housebuilding, was high on the agenda of the incoming Coalition 
Government in 2010. Once elected it rapidly set about implementing major and 
unprecedented structural reform of the planning system. This both raised the profile of 
planning in a political context, both locally and nationally and, framed in a rhetoric of 
localism, significantly raised expectations of increased control of plan-making, the setting of 
housing targets and planning decisions at a local level. Initially, the swift abolition of the 
strategic regional tier within the planning system and two-year delay in publishing a new 
policy framework left a ‘planning vacuum’ (House of Commons, 2011). This, paradoxically, 
left ministers with weak strategic policy control and little basis to exert operational control. In 
Tonkiss and Flinders’ (2016), terms there was something of a hiatus with a shift towards a 
looser framework of parental management of PINS. Publication of the NPPF in 2012 did 
little to address this strategic deficit.  Parallel narratives within the framework of on the one 
hand ‘localism’ and the presumption in favour of sustainable development on the other were 
reflected in ‘incoherence and incompatibility’ (Lees et al 2015).  Detailed planning guidance 
having been swept away, there was lack of clarity as well in terms of the detailed 
interpretation and implementation of policy in practical terms, particularly early on.  
Planning Inspectors were consequently left mediating these tensions, finding themselves in a 
more active position of adjudication, in some areas effectively making policy through their 
decisions. This represented a clear shift in both role and practice. Ministers were increasingly 
faced with parallel – and seemingly irreconcilable – pressures, the need to: evidence their 
initial claims that reforms would speed up plan-making, support housing delivery and 
sustainable growth; and, to respond to constituency level pressures where inspectors’ 
decisions were being publicly maligned as running counter to the Government’s own 
narrative on localism. 
The political fall-out of these pressures heightened ministerial interest in plan-making, 
planning decisions and projected housing numbers and their desire to influence outcomes to 
suit political needs, however contradictory. Against the backdrop of the loss of strategic 
planning, the ‘bonfire’ of regional agencies’ (Cameron, 2009), and major reductions in civil 
service capabilities around planning (including in PINS’ own parent department), PINS was 
exposed as one of the few mechanisms available to Government to influence planning 
outcomes. This – almost inevitably - put PINS in the spotlight with ministers and politicians 
at both central and local levels increasingly focused on the substance and detail of inspector’s 
decision-making and eager to attempt to ‘control’ or ‘discipline’ this activity. This 
represented a major shift in the relationship between PINS and government ministers a shift 
in particular from the earlier period in which ministers were described as more interested in 
the quasi-judicial legitimacy rather than substance of decisions (Barker and Couper, 1984). It 
also represented after an initial hiatus in the immediate post-reform period a major shift in the 
‘parent department-agency relationship’ towards a more over-bearing or authoritarian style of 
parenting focused on operational control on a case by case basis. 
Implications for the Planning Inspectorate 
The impact of these drivers of change was framed by the Inspectorate’s culture of 
independence, a culture that preceded its status as an agency and stemmed from the quasi-
judicial nature of its work. Grant (2000b, 6) previously observed the ‘tension between the 
theory and the reality of the Planning Inspectorate’s independence’, noting the potential for a 
‘[ministerial] direction … at any time’ being ‘enough to deprive the inspector of the requisite 
appearance of independence, notwithstanding the limited exercise of the power in practice’ 
(ibid). Clear evidence in this case of a demonstrable shift in the use of powers of ‘direction’ 
has brought to the fore the tensions for inspectors operating with ‘relative independence’ 
(Mualam, 2014, 49) in a quasi-judicial sphere.  
For the Inspectorate as a whole, any implication that control shifts have overtly 
challenged its independence – such that it is seen as more proximate to ministers – brings 
reputational risk, elevates the prospect of court challenge7, and has the potential to instigate 
further debate about PINS’ continuing agency status. As Verhoest (2018, 336) observed, ‘a 
strong reputation … enables agencies to force more autonomy or to protect their autonomy in 
times of crisis’. For individual inspectors, this post-reform period has been described as 
“intensely difficult”, with inspectors publicly exposed in an unprecedented way. This has 
demonstrably impacted their sense of autonomy, irrespective of whether intervention has 
materially impacted their decisions. There also appears to have been a shift in the way both 
inspectors and ministers perceive the role of a planning inspector: away from a previously 
envisaged professional role in which an inspector is “beholden to no-one, not even 
government” (research interviewee), towards a more active role as an agent in the delivery of 
government policy, more responsive to political will. 
Implications for the planning system 
For the planning system more broadly, the implications are potentially fundamental. The 
policy-administrative split brought about by NPM – and represented in agencification - 
arguably enhanced the legitimacy of planning minsters having both a policy-maker and 
appellate role. Any tightening of control manifested as political interference in decision 
making would re-blur the line between policy and administration, posing challenges to the 
right within the planning system to a fair and impartial appeal by an ‘independent tribunal, 
whose decisions must take account of all evidence put to them as well as local and national 
planning policy’ (Pitt, 2013, 1). There has, however, been little substantive evidence of 
interference resulting in decisions that have not been justifiable in policy terms, with 
interviewees describing ‘attempts’ to influence as ‘subtle’, resulting in ‘no significant 
outcomes, only one or two minor influences’. Moreover, it is arguable that ‘attempts’ may 
have – in fact - been restrained by the legal checks and balances of the quasi-judicial nature 
of PINS.  
Where ministerial ‘control’ has had a material impact, has been in the use of ‘powers 
of direction’ (Grant 2000a) – the strengthening of powers on local plan call-in and the 
recovery of appeals. These mechanisms have publicly reduced the powers of PINS. Their use 
has also implied a lack of trust in inspectors taking decisions in line with established policy or 
the Government agenda more generally. Use of these powers has deftly deflected attention 
                                                          
7 The Inspectorate saw high staff turnover during the research period, and there have been reported and ongoing 
recruitment challenges (Donnelly, 2018, Richards, 2018). 
away from the inconsistencies and lack of clarity within Government policy, and onto the 
practice of inspectors.  
The Planning Inspectorate and New Political Governance? 
We reflect, finally on the changes as they have impacted on the Inspectorate from the 
perspective of New Political Governance and the implications of this as a framework for 
making sense of shifts in policy regimes. New Public Management, it has been argued had 
left politicians with ‘feelings of impotence’ (Peters, 2009, 6), and wanting to ‘re-assert their 
authority’ (Boston and Halligan, 2012, 204). Subsequent reforms focused on ‘strengthening 
the capacity of the centre, both politically and administratively’ (Christensen and Lægreid 
2007, 1060) with an increased emphasis on more formal vertical control in preference to the 
‘hub and spoke’ model of NPM. A more politicised environment emerged, with reported 
behavioural shifts in the relationship between ministers and civil servants, with politicians 
challenging ‘these once-secret gardens of professional-administrative decision making’ 
(Laffin 2016, 358) and ‘the role of ministers shifting towards a greater stress on “political 
bureaucratic management”’ (ibid). 
This very much captures the shifts as described here in the relationship between 
government ministers and the Planning Inspectorate. Those interviewed for this study 
consistently described the operational environment of PINS as having become, as one 
respondent put it, ‘particularly politicised’. The desire for greater control on the part of 
ministers was best exemplified by the reported internal review of PINS’ independence, 
focused on the potential absorption of PINS into its parent department. Although no 
fundamental structural changes to PINS have occurred, greater vertical control was described 
in the new framework document and changes in the nature and frequency of communication 
between PINS and the core executive. If the initial intention of agencification under NPM 
was ‘less opportunity for intervention and control’ (James and Thiel 2013, 209) and fewer 
‘day-to-day instructions from ministers and policymakers’ (Elston 2017, 87), then recent 
experience suggests a reversal of this in practice.   
Importantly, however, whilst the behaviour of ministers was emboldened by wider 
cultural shifts within the civil service described as impacting political-bureaucratic 
relationships more broadly under the NPG model, change, more specifically, in the PINS-
executive relationship appears to have been primarily driven by the greater politicization of 
planning decisions.  It largely reflected post-reform planning policy rather than a more 
general desire to assert or re-assert a particular politico-administrative relationship for its own 
sake. This reflects wider NPG accounts (Christensen 2012, Osborne 2010, Aucoin 2012, 
Grube 2015) suggesting that politically salient administrative activities are likely to be most 
impacted. However, in contrast to a central narrative of NPG of strengthened central capacity 
to control sub-ordinate institutions, the desire to control PINS appears to have been driven by 
decreased institutional capacity on planning and ineffective strategic control. It is – 
paradoxically - the paucity of alternative control mechanisms on planning that has forced 
PINS to swim ‘in the waters closest to parliamentary view’ (Judge et al 1997). The 
importance of planning reform as a driver of change is clearly specific to the case of the 
Planning Inspectorate.  As a case study within a particular policy sector this does, however, 
have more general implications for our understanding of New Political Governance.  
First, the case of PINS provides a specific example of what Elston (2014) referred to 
as the loss of the ‘autonomization logic’ (474) in which ‘managerial empowerment, 
devolution and de-politization is being replaced by counter-themes of ministerial control and 
centralization’ (459). Executive agencies have not figured strongly in the literature on NPG. 
The case of PINS, however, illustrates that such agencies are by no means immune to the sort 
of shifts captured in the discourse of NPG. The Inspectorate has been at the sharp end of 
these shifts, with its staff under pressure to respond to ministerial pressure as ‘agents of 
government’, whilst also maintaining an impartial view in the exercise of their statutory 
responsibilities. This substantiates the claim of Boston and Halligan (2012), that the potential 
effects of NPG are likely to be more acutely felt by those with responsibility for the delivery 
of specific statutory responsibilities, where responsiveness to political will is not the only 
responsibility. For PINS – exercising a quasi-judicial function analogous to that of a tribunal 
but under the constant ‘threat’ of court action – this is acutely the case. 
Secondly, wider debate about NPG has centered on the extent of the shifts witnessed. 
Rather than the complete replacement of one paradigm with another, Christensen referred to 
‘within-paradigm shifts’: ‘post NPM having simply modified elements of NPM’ (2012). For 
PINS, shifts in control have occurred alongside a structure that, despite modifications, still 
typifies much of the original NPM intent. It still recruits and appoints its own staff and, 
despite attempts, remains in control over the disaggregation of its budget.  The sort of cultural 
shifts implied by NPG have, moreover, not been universally absorbed, or, as the title of this 
study suggests, accepted. As one interviewee asserted, experienced inspectors were more 
minded to say, “sod off minister, it’s your bloody NPPF”.   Civil servants involved in less 
politically sensitive aspects of the work of PINS may also have been less impacted by the sort 
of pressures described here.  As Christensen asserts, it is entirely possible that two paradigms 
may exist and abut against one another within a particular institution. Verhoest (2018) 
similarly suggests the possibility of hybrid arrangements as a result of a layering of different 
agency models - pre-NPM, NPM, and post-NPM.  
Thirdly, and in contrast to Flinders and Tonkiss’ (2016) conclusion of ‘a stark shift in 
the relationship between departments and arms-length bodies that is commonly characterized 
by officials and ministers within Whitehall in the explicit language of a shift from ‘loose–
loose to tight–tight’ (499), the experience of PINS indicates that this may be an over-
simplification. More recent evidence relating to PINS suggests some possible easing in 
control attempts. An external appointee as the most recent incumbent to the role of PINS’s 
chief executive and the re-calibration of PINS’s triennial review status to priority 2 (a 
reduction in the priority with which Government will carry out any review focused on its 
purpose, existence or, critically, potential re-integration) is evidence of this. This not only 
supports the hypothesis that NPG is not necessarily a fundamental break with the past, but 
also raises the possibility of a return to a previous state, away from such close ministerial and 
parliamentary scrutiny following a period of heightened interest.  
 
Finally, the Planning Inspectorate’s experience highlights the absolute importance of 
policy clarity in achieving an appropriate balance between strategic control and operational 
autonomy. As one interviewee observed above, ‘a well-run planning system needs maximum 
black and white, and minimum grey’. This concept is directly transferable to effective agency 
practice, and despite recent policy reviews, the continued absence of a stronger strategic 
framework (and effective guidance on its application in practice) leaves the prospect of 
achieving this balance - or in Fukayama’s (2013) terms ‘sweet spot’ of good governance 
(2013) - some way-off for PINS. This remains acutely case whilst centralism in the form of 
the NPPF and localism and the desire for local freedoms remain in such tension within the 
English planning system. More broadly, PINS experience also highlights the potential 
subtlety and skill needed in handling department-agency relationships, particularly when 
dealing with policy issues that are both politically salient and bring with them legal and other 
associated risks, where trust is an important pre-requisite.  
 
Three important directions for further research arise from this study. Firstly, on-going 
monitoring of the PINS-Core Executive relationship is essential to explore further the claim 
about the potential return to a previous governance state following a period of heightened 
political interest. Secondly, research on the relationship between the Inspectorate and its 
sponsors within the Welsh Government would offer an interesting comparative perspective 
within a similar policy discipline. Thirdly, whilst not a central theme to this study, a number 
of interviewees intimated at a breakdown of trust between ministers and officials. Recent 
comparative work on agency governance highlights trust is being integral to agency 
autonomy, but suggests that contrary ‘to the commonly held belief that agencies will be 
reluctant to have close contact with their principles in order to safeguard their autonomy 
(Verhoest 2018, 336), trust can be ‘enhanced by more intense contacts with principals’. 
Given that more intense contact between PINS officials and ministers appears to have been 
unwelcome, strategies for building trust in the context of a quasi-judicial function such as 
PINS, would merit further and more in-depth investigation. 
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